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Exit Rights and Entrance Paths:
Accommodating Cultural Diversity
in a Liberal Democracy
Sigal Ben-Porath
The debate over the accommodation of culture in liberal democracies tends to emphasize exit rights. Autonomy is typically taken as
a pre-condition for exit, and public schools are often charged with promoting or facilitating it. I argue that diversity liberals have a
more justifiable view than that of autonomy liberals on cultural accommodation, but diversity liberalism too should reframe its view
of exit rights. Narrow exit rights that protect basic human rights should be maintained and augmented with entrance paths into
general society. I further suggest that for exit rights along with entrance paths to provide themorally required conditions for accom-
modating culture while respecting freedom, policies in this realm should be designed to address adults rather than children. I con-
sider the effect of this dual change of perspective on the accommodation of culture in democratic institutions, including schools.
T he tension between the accommodation of compre-hensive communities on the one hand, and theenforcement of exit rights to protect individuals
within these communities on the other, is an ongoing
challenge in liberal democracies. I aim to relieve some of
this tension by suggesting that liberal democracies should
focus more attention on providing individual members of
comprehensive communities with entrance paths into other
parts of society rather than intervening in these commu-
nities to protect a robust form of exit rights. Entrance
paths can be supported by policies that aim to reduce the
cost of entry into dominant society by providing oppor-
tunities for exiting members of comprehensive communi-
ties to engage in work, leisure, and civic life. Only by
sustained attention to and support for such paths can lib-
eral democracies truly accommodate cultural diversity in
ways consistent with liberal pluralism.
Consider the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints (FLDS), a comprehensive community
whose values and practices are clearly distinct from those
of dominant American society. In recent years, the Amer-
ican public has learned of two separate cases of exit from
this sect. First was the depiction of “lost boys”—young
men who left the sect, some voluntarily, others sent off by
the leader,Warren Jeffs, whose professed support of polyg-
amy necessitated having fewer young men than young
women in the sect’s compound.1 Later, the sect was again
in the news with the dramatic images of law enforcement
officials removing 439 children and young women from
the sect’s Yearning for Zion ranch in Texas following alle-
gations of forced underage marriage, child abuse, and rape
by Jeffs and several male members.2
The removal of this large group of youngsters from the
compound and supposedly away from the influence of the
sect’s leader seems to offer amass exit opportunity for some
of the sect’s vulnerablemembers.The interventionbyauthor-
ities, aimed at protecting these young women and children
from an apparent violation of their rights, clashed in some
cases with the women’s expressed preferences (uninformed
as they might be), and illustrated the ever-present tension
between the protection of individual freedoms and rights
and the accommodation of culture. Both the right to exit
one’s cultural group and the commitment of dominant
liberal-democratic society to enable such exit are key aspects
of democratic theory today.3 Liberal theorists, including
those committed to cultural rights, viewcultural groupswith
suspicion as they consider granting themgroup rights, inter-
vening in theirpractices, orprotecting their vulnerablemem-
bers. Many liberal theories are concerned with proposing
ways to curb the harmful effects of culture on individual
flourishing or political equality. The social realm that lib-
eral theorists tend to envision is one in which there is a
dominant society governedbyprinciples of autonomy, indi-
viduality and rationality, within which enclaves of
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comprehensive groups endorse practices that compromise
some of the core principles of this mainstream society. For
this line of liberal thinking, one major challenge is finding
a suitable response to individuals within these subgroups,
some of whom may be perfectly content with their condi-
tion (albeit not necessarily in a reflective way) while others
may be oppressed or wish to leave for other reasons. Most
liberal responses to the challenge presented by illiberal cul-
tures share a common feature: a focus on support for exit
rights. As SusanMollerOkinput it, “Any consistent defense
of group rights or exemptions that is based on liberal prem-
ises has to ensure that at least one individual right—the right
to exit one’s group of origin—trumps any group right . . .
Not to be able to leave the group in which one has been
raised for an alternativemode of life is a serious violation of
the kind of freedom that is basic to liberalism.”4
Defending a more minimalist view, diversity liberalism
prefers the protection of culture over the protection of
certain rights of individuals within cultures, maintaining
that “liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not
the valorization of choice.”5 William Galston, convinc-
ingly arguing for the importance of diversity, thus rejects a
variety of interventions including autonomy facilitation
through education (a topic I critically discuss in detail
below), as this newly acquired autonomy might spill over
to individuals’ personal lives and undermine their capa-
bility to “live their lives in ways that express their deepest
beliefs about what gives meaning or value to life.”6
While my argument is developed on the foundations of
the diversity liberalism enunciated byGalston andSpinner-
Halev (among others), it amends this vision by arguing that
the protection of minimalist exit rights (requiring as little
or less intervention than diversity liberals typically foresee)
ought to be supplemented by more extensive policies pro-
moting what I call “entrance paths.”7 Beyond their signif-
icant differences, both liberal views—autonomy liberalism
and diversity liberalism—share a commitment to exit.Gal-
stonmaintains that “enforcement of basic rights of citizen-
ship and of exit rights, suitably understood, will usually
suffice” for the purpose of enforcing basic liberties.8 Jeff
Spinner-Halev, despite his convincing claim that “internal
and external restrictions are necessary for a community to
retain its identity”9 and his subsequent support for accom-
modating restrictive (or “non-reflective”) communities,
maintains that the conditions of independencemust be safe-
guarded, as they ensure “that no one in the community is
coerced. In sum, there must be a real right of exit.”10
I argue that in their minimalist form, exit rights offer
little more than lip service, stating that all must be able to
exit but providing little detail about how this exit is to be
realized and little support for its realization. The lost boys
who left FLDS voluntarily exercised their exit rights with
mixed results, and the process of disentangling their lives
from their earlier affiliation was long and painful, with
many of them experiencing disengagement, substance
abuse, unemployment, and other difficulties. The inclina-
tion and capacity of other boys to exit may be diminished
by the experiences of their peers. In these ways exit rights
may, in practice, sometimes be counterproductive to the
very freedoms they purport to advance.
Further, in their more robust form, exit rights are con-
strued to require interventions that may threaten core
values of some cultural sub-groups, as well as some prin-
ciples of liberal democracy, and thus may not provide
true accommodation of cultural difference. Such was the
removal of women and children from the FLDS com-
pound, which presented a crude intervention into a com-
prehensive group in an effort to ensure the protection of
human rights (freedom from abuse) and the rule of law
(preventing rape and forced underage marriage), but also
to ensure the ability of vulnerable members to exit their
group if they so choose. While this is an extreme case,
the challenge it presents to the discussion of exit is sig-
nificant and extends to other cultures and other forms of
intervention as well, as I will aim to show. A less striking
and more common form of unjustified intervention is
the focus on autonomy-facilitating education in public
schools. I suggest that less interventionist policies, pro-
moting entrance paths, should augment diversity-focused,
narrowly construed exit rights as a democratic response
to the challenge of cultural diversity.11 Policies and social
structures that offer entrance paths, like those afforded to
(documented) immigrants, can provide opportunities sim-
ilar to those of substantial exit rights, without the moral
burden and some of the adverse political consequences
that interventions related to robust exit rights entail. A
narrow version of exit rights combined with a strong focus
on entrance would thus support a productive response to the
needs of members of comprehensive communities, while min-
imizing the necessity to trespass the boundaries of these com-
munities to protect their members. After establishing the
meaning and role of entrance paths, I apply this concept
to the educational dimensions of accommodating cul-
tures. Specifically, I consider the role of public schools in
preparing future citizens and the complications this raises
for liberal democrats. Weighing the arguments for diver-
sity and for choice in the context of schooling strength-
ens my (diversity-based) argument for entrance paths,
and particularly supports a focus on adults rather than
on children as the relevant constituency for exit/entrance
policies. The consideration of the role of schools in a
liberal democracy further justifies prioritizing entrance
into dominant society over interventions into sub-cultures.
Comprehensive Communities in
Liberal Democracies
For the purpose of the current discussion, I follow a fairly
non-controversial description of culture offered in the
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“Culture is a historically created system of meaning and
significance or, what comes to the same thing, a system of
beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human
beings understand, regulate and structure their individual
and collective lives.”12 It is worth noting that this is a
broad conception of cultural groups, incorporating both
religious and other forms of cultural affiliation.
Comprehensive cultural communities—sometimes ref-
erenced in the literature as “encompassing,” “societal,” or
“non-reflective” communities—13 are defined here as com-
munities whose laws, institutions, and practices regulate
the full range of their members’ activities. Some compre-
hensive groups used here to illustrate the argument are the
FLDS, certain Jewish Orthodox communities in the US
like the Satmars, and the Amish.
The accommodation of cultural sub-groups challenges
liberal democracies to closely consider their value systems
and their democratic practices. A common assumption is
that liberal democratic ideals are threatened by a broad
range of comprehensive communities. How should a lib-
eral democratic polity respond to comprehensive, some-
times non-reflective or non-liberal value sets endorsed by
some of its members?14 Should these be discouraged, or
would such a response undermine the very cause of liberal
democracies? And if they are tolerated, will that not create
a danger in the form of sub-groups within the citizenry
which reject and possibly actively oppose basic tenets of
society?Moreover, how will the rights of individuals within
these communities be protected? These are some of the
originating questions for heated scholarly, judicial, and
social debates. The responses to these questions are often
based on prioritizing either diversity or autonomy, and
thus range from demands for institutional support for all
cultures, to calls for Socratic education as a means to devel-
oping autonomy (and thus rejecting non-reflective views)
in all children.15
The focus of much current discussion is the question of
howmuch protection do members of comprehensive com-
munities need and what forms should this protection take.
The case in defense of comprehensive communities and
against crude intervention in their practices has been made
by numerous authors committed to diversity,16 who have
broadly argued that the threat posed by these communi-
ties to their members and to the dominant society is not
as grave as some liberals presume. Devoutly religious com-
munities and other comprehensive groups, these authors
broadly argue, can still participate in many of the public
practices expected of citizens, and allow their members
degrees of freedom sufficient for the purpose of civic equal-
ity. On the other hand, liberal democratic theorists com-
mitted to autonomy as a basic ideal often advocate for
greater intervention in comprehensive cultural groups so
as to ensure the protection of vulnerable members, espe-
cially women and children. The discussion of children
often quickly turns to education and the presumed obli-
gation of the state to facilitate the development of their
autonomy. This obligation may stand in opposition to the
state’s tolerance of diversity, or to its willingness to protect
sub-cultures that do not give precedence to autonomy.
Both gender equality and autonomy-facilitating educa-
tion seem to align with the liberal claim for freedom and
choice for all members of society. At the same time they
seem to threaten some cultural traditions and the prospect
of cultural autonomy by intervening in traditional rela-
tions among members of cultural groups—as highlighted
in the case of the FLDS intervention with which I began.
Typically, the way out of this theoretical impasse provided
by both autonomy liberals and diversity liberals is a strong
justification of the priority of exit rights.
Exit Rights
Many liberal theorists accept that cultural affiliation plays
a significant role in shaping individuals’ personal makeup
and influencing their choices. As K. Anthony Appiah puts
it, “we make choices, but we do not determine the options
among which we choose.”17 Theorists of culture and cul-
tural identity vary widely in their understanding of the
ways in which culture generates the horizons of choice,
and in their subsequent normative conceptions of how
democracies should respond to cultures. Most theorists,
however, agree on one point—the preeminent impor-
tance of the right to exit.18 Many insist that exit rights
provide a key way of ensuring that all individuals have an
opportunity to exercise their autonomy.
The concept of exit rights starts with the notion of the
individual as a member of a group, and maintains a con-
cept of the individual as an author of her own fate. It
focuses on the practical possibility of a rift between one’s
own preferences, beliefs, or rights, and the preferences,
beliefs, or rights of one’s group. Assuming the primacy of
the individual over her group leads to prescribing exit
rights as a just solution, which is often discussed in rela-
tion to the position of women in traditional comprehen-
sive communities. Autonomy liberals suggest changes in
traditional property practices that would equalize women’s
standing within their communities and support their capac-
ity to exit, as well as changes to marriage customs and
other traditions.19 In addition, for advocates of substan-
tive exit rights, the education of children—including girls
of course—is a key way for realizing these rights.
However, the discussion of exit rights in contemporary
theory and policy tends to suffer from one of two short-
comings. On the one hand, it sometimes offers an empty
promise, a declarative right that is accompanied by neither
clear social and legal requirements nor mechanisms of
enforcement. Within the web of rights supported by the
liberal democratic state, exit rights stand in tension with
other forms of protection and accommodation (similar
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relations with each other).20 By stating that individuals are
to be allowed to leave their groups, as many have acknowl-
edged, the state does not provide thosewishing to leavewith
a real opportunity to extract themselves from the cultures
inwhich they live. Lackingmoney andother resources, such
individuals may find themselves trapped in their cultures
of origin without a real way out. Recognizing this diffi-
culty, some theorists have moved to demand that compre-
hensive cultures (including illiberal ones) providemembers
who wish to exit with the full opportunity to do so with
little damage. While, as Jacob Levy states, a culture from
which an exit has no cost cannot be considered a culture,21
therehavebeen significant theoretical aswell as legal attempts
to ensure that the cost of exit is lowered, so that it becomes
realistically possible.22 Such attempts include the redistri-
bution of property and reassignment of property rights, as
well as robust demands in the domain of education.
This more robust protection of exit raises the second
risk I point to in the debate on exit rights. While more
realistic exit rights support individuals in their quest for
departure, they stand the risk of intervening in compre-
hensive communities to the point where such communi-
ties have little cultural autonomy left. When realistic exit
rights are instituted—such as when children are required
to develop their autonomy through education—or when
communities are required to change their inheritance and
property laws so that all members have the material capac-
ity to exit, traditional ways of life may be at risk. Inas-
much as culture in its diversity is a good that enhances
personal well being, realistic exit rights can undermine
some individuals’ well being (premised on belonging to
their culture) for the sake of others’ (premised on their
capacity to leave that same culture), a tension that gen-
erates a significant moral burden for policy makers and
theorists alike. Recent discussions have developed a care-
ful analysis of multicultural clash points and their conse-
quences.23 Within some of these discussions there is a
growing recognition that when exit rights are realized
through intervention, their potential as a main tool for
accommodating culture becomes dubious.24 In these
detailed responses to the multicultural and gendered chal-
lenges to accommodation and tolerance, the key role of
dominant society is still focused on varying levels of inter-
vention in minority cultural groups. The expectation of
self-reflection and self-correction on the part of liberal
society is minimal. The burden of justification lies entirely
on the comprehensive communities.
How should society respond to these conflicting visions
about vulnerable members of comprehensive groups? I
argue that democratic diversity can be accomplished
through augmenting minimal exit rights with the prac-
tices that I describe as entrance paths, which address adults
rather than children, and which are less interventionist in
both family and culture than what substantial exit rights
require.
Before turning to discuss entrance paths, I briefly exam-
ine the question of the motivation to exit. Through this
discussion, I hope to substantiate a realistic view of the
individual as both culturally embedded and capable of
considering alternative ways of life.
Why Exit?
Leaving a culture, particularly a comprehensive one, is not
a step individuals tend to take lightly.25 Appiah’s question
is appropriate here: “Is an identity group something you
can simply resign from?”26 What might be the reasons for
individuals to aspire to exit a comprehensive group, one
that establishes and reflects significant parts of their iden-
tity and that provides meaning and structure to various
aspects of their lives? While individual motivations are
probably as varied in this case as they are in any other
human endeavor, the ones most relevant to the exit rights
discussion can be divided into two categories:
(1) Attitudinal change: Individuals often wish to leave
because they have lost some key element needed to
motivate them inmaintaining their affiliation.They
may have lost their belief in the main tenets of the
religion or value system; their sense of affiliation
may have been compromised by an awkward expe-
rience; or their support of the communal goals may
have diminished as a result of rethinking.
(2) A sense of injustice: Individuals sometimes wish
to leave a comprehensive group because they feel
(often justifiably) that they are discriminated against
or oppressed within their group, as a result of some
of its key norms. This motivation has often been
discussed in the literature, particularly in relation
to women and minorities-within-minorities.27
Clearly, the twomotivations can be mixed, such as when
one loses her faith because of her sense that the group is
unjust in its treatment of certain members (possibly includ-
ing herself ) or when one is oppressed because she does
not present the appropriate levels of commitment to the
group’s main tenets. And yet the motivations are nonethe-
less distinct, and present distinct challenges to the liberal
democratic state. In the latter case—where individuals expe-
rience themselves as oppressed by the group to which they
belong, and believe that their rights have been abridged
by this group—it would seem reasonable to expect some
form of basic state intervention sufficient to adjudicate
rights claims and to protect and secure aminimal claim—an
individual right of exit. But in the former case, where
what is at issue is simply an individual’s change of heart
rather than a sense of oppression, what is at stake is a
matter of individual choice, which does not demand such
protection.28 Such situations require an assumption of
descriptive minimal autonomy available to individuals
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nothing more than provide those individuals who are not
oppressed but who wish to exit of their own volition with
readily available paths of entry into society. But whether
or not such individuals embark on these paths is entirely
up to them. Both cases assume that individuality precedes
group identity and transcends it, while at the same time
maintaining a respectful view of group affiliation. Yet the
challenges they present to society are different, and so
should the responses be.
Consider Franky, a former member of FLDS and a lost
boy.29 During his late teens his belief in the teachings of
Warren Jeffs—the sect leader—waned, althoughhe still val-
ued the man himself as a mentor. Franky decided to leave
the sect’s enclosed compound and look for another way of
life at a nearby town, outside his community. As he left, his
ties to his family and to the world in which he was raised
were for the most part severed, and he left behind much of
what was dear to him, and much that he still valued.
While Franky’s path carries some strong resemblance to
Millian self-authorship, it is unclear why the state should
sponsor this process through intervening in his group’s
practices or ensuring a low price for his exit. In a liberal
society many important and consequential personal deci-
sions, like marriage or relocation, are routinely made by
individuals on their own. While the right to make such
decisions is protected by certain liberties such as the free-
dom of movement (and regulated by some laws), no state
intervention is expected for individuals who fail to develop,
or choose not to enter, or decide to exit, spousal relations.
Similarly, there is no room for intervention in an attempt
to regulate the decision making process of Franky and
other individuals who face similar choices, or for those
other boys in Franky’s situation who choose to stay with
FLDS. The state should provide such individuals with
some support once they exit, in the form of entrance paths,
but this support should not take the form of intervention
(of the type that Okin and others call for) in the practices
of their group, encouragement to exit or provision of tools
and skills to exit, as long as no rights are being violated.
Thus, while Franky was probably not given the opportu-
nity by FLDS to develop his autonomy to its fullest, as
some autonomy liberals would favor, his circumstances
and capacities still allowed him to exit his comprehensive
group of his own volition.
But what happens when individual rights are violated
within comprehensive groups? Consider Teresa, an FLDS
member who at 17 is the mother of a young baby, who
apparently was fathered by a relative who is twice her
age.30 If Teresa wishes to exit, and if her wish is a result of
oppression or abuse, clearly the liberal-democratic state is
required to support the exit attempt in order to prevent or
end the infringement of Teresa’s rights. If the discussion of
supports for exit is limited to such cases, there is little
need to extend them beyond existing legal and related
mechanisms to protect the rights of all individuals in a
democracy. Minimal exit rights which protect the rights
of individuals are all that would be required. If the regu-
lations of sexual consent (or statutory rape) and the legal
age for marriage were violated, the state can and should
respond. It should do so in any cultural context, as there is
no justification to exempt groups from legal regulations
that are meant to protect the basic rights of individuals,
and thus the existing legal mechanisms should suffice to
support Teresa.
But many scholarly arguments go much further.31 They
suggest that in order to facilitate escape from these cir-
cumstances, the state must require that Franky and Teresa
be educated to know their rights and opportunities, and
also ensure that they are able to own property—an
unacceptable idea to some groups—so that they do not
have economic disincentives to leaving.32 However, require-
ments such as those—to educate all children or to redis-
tribute resources within the group—go too far. They fail
to strike a balance between accommodating cultural tra-
ditions (that contribute to individuals’ sense of belonging
and well being) and protecting individuals from harmful
circumstances within these cultures, opting for more pro-
tection at the price of less accommodation. Supporting
Teresa through instituting narrow exit rights is a clear
requirement of a state that endorses human rights as part
of its basic structure. Beyond that, entrance paths should
provide an appropriate response to many of Teresa’s and
Franky’s needs in ways that avoid the political and moral
costs of substantial educational or economic intervention.
In the following section I elaborate on the concept of
entrance paths for exiting members (acting on either moti-
vation) of comprehensive groups, which should augment
the minimal form of exit rights that protect against gross
human rights violations.
Entrance Paths
A vision of democracy that prioritizes diversity as a way to
support individual flourishing should be committed to
supporting individual members of comprehensive groups
not only through minimally protecting exit but also by
creating gateways for individuals who prefer ways of life
other than the ones in which they were raised. While
entrance is in many ways simply the other side of exit, it is
often taken for granted in scholarly discussions of exit
rights. This neglect often minimizes the significant obsta-
cles and costs to entry presented by mainstream society
itself.33 Learning new ways of being, acquiring new skills,
social ties and capital, sometimes a new language—all these
have material and existential costs that must be consid-
ered in creating a full account of exit. Exit rights may
provide an opportunity to abandon oppressive conditions
and exchange them with a way of life that offers more
personal freedom. But they offer little direction for navi-
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Liberal theorists tend to assume that freedom is its
own reward, and that leaving behind an illiberal way of
life provides in itself an opportunity to thrive. This view
meshes well with a vision of dominant society as com-
prised of individuals who freely and consensually exchange
positions, views and property with each other. In a lib-
eral democratic society that affords exit rights for all,
members of comprehensive groups are free to leave their
groups and join others, or leave their groups and live as
members-at-large of the society of individuals. But mov-
ing from one group to the next does not make one a
regular member of the group they have entered, even
when the new group is as loosely organized as liberal
democratic society seems. A person’s upbringing and their
original affiliation stays with them in many ways. Some
of these ways relate to physical appearance, especially
when group affiliation is based on race or ethnicity. Oth-
ers are more cultural, as signified by the prefix “former”
that is often attached to self-identifications. Communi-
ties of ex-members, such as ex-Mormons and ex-Amish,
often maintain some of the cultural or religious practices
and commitments they had in their group of origin,
albeit in an amended form; these often serve important
social, cultural and religious purposes for their members,
and they can indeed facilitate certain forms of entrance
for them.34 And it is not only that such individuals see
themselves as partially defined by their earlier affiliation.
Just as important, members of the broader society often
see them this way as well. Entrance into mainstream
society, then, is no simple matter.
What do entrance paths require? How should they be
organized, and what institutional forms might they take?
Entrance paths that provide opportunity for engagement
in civic life, work, and leisure within dominant society
can support the transition of ex-members without requir-
ing them to relinquish their ties to the community of
origin. Chandran Kukathas puts it this way: “The most
important condition which makes possible a substantive
freedom to exit a community is the existence of a wider
society that is open to individuals wishing to leave their
local groups.”35 But the mere existence of an open society,
I suggest, is not enough. Active engagement with entering
members is a necessary condition for many who take the
step, or enter the process, of exiting a comprehensive group.
This active engagement can be both legal and social. Legally,
it can occur through the endorsement of laws like the
Utah Emancipation Statute (and similar laws enacted in
13 states)36 that allow runaway and homeless minors, under
certain circumstances, to be recognized as legally autono-
mous and thus support their entrance into society. When
older teenagers like Franky choose to exit their compre-
hensive group, the absence of legal guardianship can impede
their capacity to gain employment, receive medical care,
and in other ways become members of society. Emancipa-
tion statutes recognize this unique legal circumstance, and
provide an entrance path in the form of legal autonomy.
In some cases access to the judiciary is itself an entrance
path into the mainstream society, particularly when indi-
viduals are pressing claims for basic rights, either against
former associates or against individuals in the broader soci-
ety who may take advantage of their vulnerability.
Such gateways of entry for exiting individuals should
also include social dimensions. For example, institutions
of higher learning like community colleges should be
encouraged to actively seek ex-members by developing
institutional ties with organizations of ex-members, thus
providing them with opportunities to gain skills and ties
necessary for equal membership in society. Likewise, the
state can support (through providing tax-exempt status or
other benefits) organizations of former members of sub-
groups, which are often the best entrance ports into dom-
inant society for exiting individuals. Such organizations
provide many forms of emotional, informational, educa-
tional, legal, and financial solidarity and support. Individ-
uals in the midst of transition into the broader society can
indeed be likened to immigrants, even if they did not
move from across a national border. Such individuals have
special needs, and there is no reason why a liberal state
ought not to attend to these needs through public policy.
In the case of Yoder v. Wisconsin, for example,37 which
granted the Amish exemption from the last two years of
compulsory education for their children, focusing on an
entrance path would have allowed the state of Wisconsin
to also establish a fund to support adult education for
drop-outs, including Amish, who later in life struggle to
enter the workforce. Such measures do more than provide
educational and economic opportunities; they enhance
the possibility of entrance to the larger society for individ-
uals wishing to choose this path.
Other existing structures—some public, some private—
that are aimed at supporting immigrants can be used (or
replicated) to support this form of internal migration. Such
responses would include culturally sensitive provision of
services to the health needs of those who are exiting tra-
ditional societies; support in navigating the housing mar-
ket and financial institutions; and other related forms of
assistance that can sometimes be found in “immigrant
clinics.”38 Spinner-Halev acknowledges the need for such
support and its practical implications: “To enable people
to leave by easing the transition to the outside world, the
Hutterites [but not the Amish or Ultra orthodox because
they can own property and save money] should set aside a
small fund for members who leave their community. . . .
No one should become wealthy by leaving, but a few
thousand dollars would help members leave the commu-
nity if they wish.”39 While he accurately identifies the
need for material support, Spinner-Halev misplaces the
responsibility for providing it. The dominant society and
its formal institutions should provide support for new
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through intervention and regulation. To illustrate using
Spinner-Halev’s example, the fund to support exiting Hut-
terites should be a public fund rather than a government-
required Hutterite fund. The Hutterites are paying the
price of exit by losing members, giving up attachments,
and weakening their already marginal group. The domi-
nant society is gaining new members as well as further
support for its already triumphing value set. Thus, it can
afford, and should be expected to pay (materially and other-
wise), for this benefit.
The institution of entrance paths is critical to making a
change of one’s cultural affiliation a realistic possibility,
regardless of the motivation for doing this.
This change of focus—fromsub-groups and exit to dom-
inant society and entrance—is justified for a number of rea-
sons. First, if exit is understood as promoting autonomy or
choice, and if those are valued by the dominant society but
not by comprehensive communities, then the burden of
realizing these values should fall on the dominant society.
Realizing these values provides dominant society with eth-
ical and expressive benefits. Shachar argues that the burden
of exit should not fall on individuals’ shoulders:
The “right of exit” solution . . . throws upon the already belea-
guered individual the responsibility to either miraculously trans-
form the legal-institutional conditions that keep her vulnerable
or to find the resources to leave her whole world behind. Surely
it is troubling when a solution demands that those who are the
most vulnerable must pay the highest price, while the abusers
remain undisturbed.40
A similar argument should hold for burdens placed on
comprehensive groups who may be marginalized or dis-
criminated against, partly because they reject the values of
choice and autonomy (or do not give them a central role
in their belief systems). Since the possibility of exit for
their members makes these groups more vulnerable or
undermines some of their goals, the cost of exit should
not be born solely by these groups, as it is when exit is
ensured through intervention in their practices. Sarah Song
recognizes the importance of shifting the focus of inter-
vention when she notes that “critique of minority norms
and practices . . . can divert attention from the majority
culture’s own inequalities, shielding them from criticism
and perhaps even fueling discourses of superiority within
the dominant culture.”41 For her this shift demands a
reconsideration of patriarchal and other unequal practices
within dominant culture.While this is an important cause,
the same premise justifies generating gateways for exiting
members to create new affiliations within the dominant
society.
Somemay argue that comprehensive groups should bear
the burden of exit, because the costs have been generated
by their illiberal ways.42 This suggestion rests on a view of
the dominant society as a free and open realm, into which
foreign elements enter carrying with them illiberal, possi-
bly dangerous ideas and ways of life. The alternative view,
which I share with Kymlicka, Appiah, Galston, and other
diversity liberals, is that society is better described as a
loose collection of individuals—some of who enjoy mul-
tiple affiliations—and groups—some of which are more
comprehensive than others. Under this description, there
is no reason to depict comprehensive groups as foreign
elements that introduce complications into an otherwise
harmonious dominant society. The cost of crossing the
lines between groups is not generated by comprehensive
groups, but rather by the priority given to boundary cross-
ing and freedom of movement by the liberal values of the
dominant society. It is thus only fair that the liberal state
should defray the cost of entrance paths for individuals
wishing to join the dominant society.
Second, focusing on entrance is justified since it expresses
an acknowledgment of the importance of cultural belong-
ing for individual well-being, while still retaining a view
of the individual as transcending her cultural group. By
limiting interventions of the liberal state in the affairs of
comprehensive communities, it allows cultural groupsmax-
imum freedom to maintain their traditional ways of life,
while at the same time respecting and supporting individ-
uals who choose to leave.
Moreover, the focus on entrance rather than on exit
alone allows the discussion to focus on adults (including
older teens) rather than on children as the relevant con-
stituency. The discussion of cultural accommodation and
choice has long been mired in the debate over parental
rights and family prerogatives. While the debate on
children’s and parents’ rights falls beyond the purview of
my argument here, it should be noted that the focus on
adults offers a less controversial argument for cultural
accommodation, one that would not be viewed as infring-
ing on parents’ right to raise their children as they see fit.
As I’ve already mentioned, many autonomy liberals have
argued that effective exit rights require that the state,
through the system of public education, introduce all chil-
dren to a comprehensive liberal pedagogy centered on the
importance of individual autonomy and voluntary associ-
ation and hence on the right of all adult citizens to exit
their groups of origin. As I argue below, many of these
education-centered arguments are misplaced. A focus on
the availability of entrance paths for adults who wish to
exit rather than on teaching children that they should
consider exit provides a morally and politically more via-
ble solution to the problem of exit.
Exit and Entrance Through Schools
For many liberal democrats, public schooling is a natural
arena in which to address challenges of cultural accommo-
dation and integration: since children are already com-
pelled to attend school, promoting liberal values there
would not involve any additional intrusion into the pri-
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exposure may still be controversial, particularly because of
its possible “spillover effect,”43 it is often assumed that for
individuals to become effective choosers they must develop
a familiarity with the diversity of values and acquire the
skills to navigate them at an early age.
Is it justified for publicly-funded schools (including pri-
vate schools enjoying tax exemptions and other benefits)
to teach children about their opportunities to exit their
cultures of origin? Despite concerns about parental rights,
some theorists answer in the affirmative, claiming that in
fact this is one of the main charges of schools as public
institutions. Exposing children to other cultures is justi-
fied as a way to generate tolerance, a key aspect of demo-
cratic society, but also as a way to facilitate autonomy and
develop critical capacities in children.44 These are some-
times used as key justifications for publicly funding schools.
InMichael Hand’s terms,45 schools are charged with devel-
oping dispositional autonomy in children (or the inclina-
tion to determine one’s own actions), and this mandate is
crucial for advancing their circumstantial autonomy (or
the condition of being free to determine one’s own actions).
In other words, if children learn to be autonomous, they
may well reject cultural and religious contexts in which
they are not free to exercise this autonomy, thus endorsing
free society over more limiting cultural contexts.
Schooling practices that provide the foundations for
substantial exit rights are commonly based on a “great
sphere” understanding of the school as a vehicle for the
integration of children from many cultures into one insti-
tution, where they learn to understand, tolerate, and respect
each other. They are taught to see value in ways of life
other than their own, and develop an autonomous vision
of the life they wish to lead. In Callan’s view this is a
safeguard against children’s servility and against allowing
parents to extend their rights into the realm of their
children’s freedom.46
Schools as great spheres are thought to protect individ-
ual rights and civic equality, while at the same time intro-
ducing the main tenets of a liberal society by teaching
children to endorse liberal democratic views. Schooling
carries the potential to liberate individuals from oppres-
sive cultures where their rights are trampled, for example
by exposing women and girls from traditional cultural
groups to visions of gender equality; at the same time this
approach presumably supports the possibility of effecting
change in these cultures by introducing their members to
other, more desirable ways of thinking that are based on
civic equality and non-discrimination.
The relationship between this liberal democratic argu-
ment about education and the liberal emphasis on exit
rights is clear: For exit rights to do what they are meant to
do, they must be made available to all members of all
cultural groups within society, who must become aware of
them, and be able to appreciate and exercise them. For
this to happen, a number of interventions by the state
into comprehensive cultural groups would be required,
first and foremost in the form of public education for all
members. This education must familiarize all members
with alternative ways of life and teach everyone how to
argue for and how to access them. All members must
possess the skills and knowledge necessary for surviving
exit, should they choose it. Diverse schools and pedagog-
ical practices are assumed to provide children with desir-
able opportunities to consider the set of values parents
and communities aim to instill in them, thereby giving
them a chance to decide for themselves about their own
conception of the good as they move forward in their lives
as free individuals.
This line of argument, I suggest, goes too far in the
direction of intervention, and should not be endorsed by
liberal democrats who are committed to cultural diversity
and tolerance. Public education should not be considered
a key part of the response to the cultural accommodation
challenge, as it goes well beyond the protection of human
rights. In addition, at least under current conditions in
the US, public schools cannot effectively respond to this
charge because families who oppose such teachings have
the choice to opt out.
Consider, for example, the traditional education of
Orthodox Jewish girls, which requires them to be shielded
from what are perceived to be the corrupting influences
of non-Orthodox society, and to learn only what is nec-
essary for fulfilling their future roles as Jewish home mak-
ers. The autonomy-liberal approach to exit rights would
necessitate a significantly different education.47 These girls
would have to be exposed to other ways of life, and learn
to question their own, thus corrupting their belief system
and their purity in the eyes of their religious leaders and
some of their fellow members. To offer them substantial
exit rights, as advocated by autonomy-liberals, they must
learn “general education” curricula, such as math and
English (particularly in communities that function in lan-
guages that are not useful for individuals who choose to
exit, such as Yiddish). Rather than attending schools that
serve only Orthodox girls, they may be required to sit in
the same classroom with boys and with members of other
cultures, as advocates of the “great sphere” demand. It is
unlikely that the community leaders would endorse this
kind of education for girls, which would be regarded as
threatening both to the perceived purity of the girls and
the prerogatives of a rabbinically-centered community. If
some girls or their families would choose such an educa-
tion, this might in itself indicate a form of exit, creating
a difference and a distance between themselves and the
rest of the community. The girls may consequently be
deemed undesirable for marriage, which is a damning
label in a closed, traditional community. The leaders and
the parents of these girls may reasonably oppose this
kind of education, as Shelley Burtt has asserted, because





Articles | Exit Rights and Entrance Paths
1028 Perspectives on Politics
is, from this perspective, fear of the corruption of faith.”48
As Song suggests, this may also generate a reactionary
response, rendering girls more vulnerable in their com-
munities, in addition to masking inequalities in domi-
nant society.
Thus, contrary to widespread assumptions, education
for autonomymay carry devastating consequences for indi-
viduals and families who belong to comprehensive com-
munities, and may significantly undermine the project of
cultural accommodation. Beyond these undesirable con-
sequences for individuals and for the moral standing of
the state whose acts may promote perverse consequences,
this form of education is not demanded by liberal demo-
cratic values. Granted, the Jewish Orthodox girls may not
be given the full set of opportunities to develop certain
dimensions of their lives. They may face a narrow field of
professional opportunities, and they may have other, sig-
nificant restrictions on their freedom of choice. But their
condition does not amount to a violation of human rights,
and does not require for the state to step in and protect
them. Belonging to a cultural group or espousing a set of
norms necessarily entails some limitation of opportuni-
ties, which is the price an individual pays for participating
in a shared moral context. Some contexts are more com-
prehensive than others, and some seem to outsiders to be
more limiting. But inasmuch as they do not violate laws
that are meant to protect individual rights or cause harm
to bodily integrity and the like, they do not amount to a
cause for intervention. Therefore, mandating autonomy-
facilitating education for individuals within these cultures
as a way to protect individuals from their effects is
unjustified.
Moreover, such an education policy is unlikely to deliver
the substantive exit rights it aspires to offer, for it is likely
simply to encourage traditionalist parents to send their
children to private schools or to home school them, in
both cases placing them beyond the reach of liberal pub-
lic education. Politically speaking, a hard core emphasis
on the an autonomy-centered system of education stands
the risk of alienating from mainstream society and its
institutions (including public schools) any and all mem-
bers of those cultures who believe that their set of values
is indeed reflective of the truth. Devout religious sects
would likely be suspicious of institutions that aim to
support their children in a journey outside their belief
system.
In this sense education for autonomy and “great sphere”
education in the public schools cannot satisfy the demands
of cultural accommodation or those of liberalism. While
schools are indeed charged with widening students’ hori-
zons, directing much of these efforts towards one’s culture
or religion seems to miss the point. In this context, choice
should not be construed as the opportunity to abandon
your way of life for another. As long as children are able to
participate as civic equals—a requirement that should be
understood as a matter of knowledge, skills, and habits
taught, rather than as a matter of soul-craft—their affili-
ations are beyond the realm of justified public (including
educational) intervention.
The argument against providing the conditions for
exit rights through schooling thus becomes, in essence, a
diversity-based argument against autonomy-facilitating
education. While this is by no means an argument against
schools’ role in teaching citizenship, this requirement
should not directly conflict with the expectations of reli-
gious parents in comprehensive communities.49 This view
of cultural accommodation does not require autonomy
facilitation or exposure to alternative ways of life; it does
not seek to encourage all individuals within society to
become autonomous authors of their lives. Instead of
focusing on socializing the young, it centers on opening
paths of entry to those who wish to exit their communi-
ties as independent individuals—as adults or as older
adolescents.
Such entrance paths should focus on those who already
wish to exit, and offer opportunities to new or aspiring
members of the dominant society. As argued above, pro-
grams such as adult education stand a better chance of
facilitating the voluntary movement of individuals into
the broader society than do more interventionist—and
threatening—approaches. Franky, like other lost boys, fell
into substance abuse when he left FLDS. He had no con-
nections, no training, and no clear way to acquire those.
Opportunities for adult education and job training, as
well as opportunities to participate in civic and commu-
nal life, could have assisted him in the transition. His key
needs were related not so much to exit as to entry. As a
new member of the dominant society he could be assisted
through professional development and work preparation
courses, through support to relevant civic organizations,
and through the recognition of his journey by dominant
society through the other legal and social means that con-
stitute entrance paths.
These entrance paths are meant to welcome new mem-
bers, accepting their decision to exchange one cultural
affiliation with another, and supporting them in the pro-
cess of becoming members-at-large of a liberal democracy.
Such policies are notmeant to encourage exit, but rather to
indicatedominant society’swillingness to support thosewho
wish to exit, and to share the burden of their decision. The
absence of entrance paths can be a strong deterrent to exit,
possibly as formidable as the original community’s efforts
to keep itsmembers in. If a liberal democracy aims to express
support for the idea that all individuals should be allowed
to change their cultural affiliations or otherwise express their
status as authors of their lives, it should start by providing
support to those who would like to join its loosely orga-
nizedpublic space. Such supportmakes sense onbothmoral
and pragmatic grounds, as liberals who are serious about
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Conclusion—Bearing the Burden
of Exit
The state enforcement of exit rights is a form of interven-
tion espoused by liberal democrats as a way to sustain a
commitment to individualism while accommodating cul-
tural groups. I have argued that the literature on this mat-
ter has been skewed in its support for more intervention
and state coercion than is pragmatically required, politi-
cally productive, or morally justified. To correct that, nar-
row exit rights that protect basic human rights should be
augmented with policies and state actions that promote
entrance paths, which do not carry the moral or prag-
matic costs of intervention but provide similar (and indeed
preferable) advantages.
Exit, as an expression of personal choice, is a key aspect
of contemporary liberal democratic approaches to accom-
modating minority cultures, particularly comprehen-
sive ones. Positioning exit as a key right for members of
minority groups seems to allow liberal democrats to
maintain their endorsement of diversity while preserv-
ing their commitment to individual rights and free-
doms. Consequently, the burden of realizing these values
should first and foremost be assigned to the dominant
society and to the liberal democratic state that “repre-
sents” it.
Moreover, instead of robustly promoting exit rights,
through autonomy-facilitating education and other forms
of intervention in communal practices, liberals should open
entrance paths while accommodating a wide range of estab-
lished conceptions of the good, and focus these policies
on adults rather than on children. Easing the transition
from comprehensive communities to dominant society
would mean taking responsibility for providing gateways
and support in adjustment. Protecting Teresa from abuse
and forced marriage is a key function of a liberal demo-
cratic state, covered by existing laws regarding sexual con-
duct and consent, and the regulation of marriage. The
state must protect her rights while allowing her to either
stay in her culture or to leave. But it is not obliged to
encourage her to leave. If she leaves, it should be of her
own volition. And in that event, she should expect to
encounter a range of practices, institutions, and struc-
tured opportunities designed to facilitate her entrance into
the dominant society, if not positively to welcome her
there.
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